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On Monday, April 12th, a jury in Baltimore County awarded $1 million to a 52-year-old woman who fell down a flight of stairs at the Belvedere hotel while attending her own bachelorette party.

Lillian Blank, who was standing on a dance floor on the 13th floor bar, fell down 19 steps, to a landing between the 12th and 13th floors of the hotel, sustaining a fractured pelvis and a fractured wrist.  She filed suit against the hotel, alleging the hotel failed to provide proper lighting at the stairs, and the dimly lit staircase had a dark rope at the top of stairs which Ms. Blank could not see.

After a 4 day trial, during which the plaintiff's alcohol consumption prior to the fall became an issue, the jury returned a verdict in her favor, awarding her $59,546 for medical expenses, $44,694 for lost wages and $895,660 for pain and suffering.  The verdict will be reduced to $791,935.70 because of the cap of non-economic damages.

 

 

Lois Farias, an 85-year-old former school crossing guard, was awarded $368,000.00 last month for injuries she sustained five years ago when a vehicle owned by the U.S. government struck her in a crosswalk while she was working as a crossing guard in Prince George's County.

Ms. Farias suffered deep tissue injury to her back, neck, knee and shoulder in the accident, for which the defendant took responsibility.  The only issue at trial was damages. The goverment contended that her pre-exisiting arthritis was to blame for her current complaints and early retirement.  Prior to trial, the government offered $125,000.00 to settle the claim.  Ultimately, U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm awarded Ms. Farias $22,000.00 in past medical expenses, $46,000.00 in lost wages and $300,000.00 in non-economic damages.  The Plaintiff was represented by Paul Bekman.

 

 

Robert E. Cahill, Sr., retired Baltimore County Circuit Court judge, died on December 14th from a long standing illness.  He was 77.  Judge Cahill will be remembered as a no-nonsense trial judge with a great legal mind and lots of instinct and wit.  His obituary appears in the Baltimore Sun.

The lawyers at Belsky, Weinberg & Horowitz had the honor of trying a variety of cases before Judge Cahill.  We learned a great deal from his handling of trials, motions and courtroom procedures.  We knew he always expected a great deal of us as advocates for our clients and we hope we lived up to his expectations.  We learned a great deal from the judge and express our condolences to his family.

The head of the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commssion, Melvin Hirschman, will retire on June 30, 2010 after serving since 1981.  The Daily Record reported this breaking story earlier today.  Mr. Hirschman has led the commission, which investigates all complaints for attorney misconduct, since 1981.  The AGC was created only six years earlier, in 1975.  Attorneys who are publically sanctioned can be viewed at the Maryland Judiciary Web Site.

Belsky, Weinberg and Horowitz partner Alan J. Belsky serves as a Panel Member for the Attorney Grievance Commision and has sat on a number of peer review panels hearing various complaints of attorney misconduct.  Peer review is confidential unless public charges are brought.  Thereafter, the matter is referred to a Circuit Court judge for findings of fact and conclusions of law.  An appeal can then be taken directly to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  Unfortunately, a fair number of reported opinions are issued every year by the Court of Appeals on issues involving attorney grievances.  Any reported opinion containing the AGC in the case name involves an attorney facing disciplinary action.

JURY REJECTS MOTORCYCLIST'S CLAIMS FOR INJURY

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In May of 2009, trial was held in Anne Arundel County in the case of a motorcyclist who was injured when he lost control of his bike and crashed. The motorcyclist alleged that another driver cut him off while trying to make a left hand turn in front of the him. The Defendant denied responsibility, arguing that the Plaintiff lost control of his motorcycle well before Defendant began to make her turn. The jury agreed with the Defendant, finding that the Plaintiff was solely responsible for his own injuries.

The attorneys at Belsky, Weinberg & Horowitz have represented many victims of automobile accidents. Our experience can be invaluable in assisting our clients who have been injured as a result of someone else's negligence. If you have been hurt in an automobile, motorcycle, or truck accident, call or email us for a free consultation and evaluation of your case.

            An issue that presents itself frequently in personal injury-related motor vehicle accident cases is the coordination of insurance benefits to pay for medical treatment and outstanding medical bills.  Many individuals carry Personal Injury Protection insurance as part of their auto insurance coverage. "PIP insurance" as it is known in the industry, affords the insured a certain limited amount of "no fault" benefits (typically $2,500) to pay medical expenses and/or lost wages incurred as a result of the accident.  The coverage is "no-fault" because it is available whether or not the insured caused the accident.  It is also "no-fault" because payment of PIP benefits has no negative impact on the insured's policy premiums, insurability or renewability.  

Yesterday, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rendered a decision of first impression in the case of MAMSI Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Wu.  In that case, the Court clarified that a patient, when presenting for medical treatment, must exhaust their PIP benefits before their health insurer is obligated to provide coverage for medical treatment.  Before this decision was rendered, there was debate in the legal, medical and insurance communities as to whether either a medical provider or an insurance company could, absent consent of the insured, "coordinate" the insured's insurance benefits so as to make the PIP primary and health insurance secondary.  The Court ruled that under the specific statute providing for PIP benefits, an insurer may elect to coordinate the benefits in such a way as to require exhaustion of all PIP benefits before a health insurer becomes obligated to begin paying medical bills and that consent of the insured is not required.

The attorneys at Belsky, Weinberg & Horowitz, LLC, handle a vast array of motor vehicle related personal injury cases.  In some instances, use of one's health insurance to pay for accident-related medical treatment has various benefits that should be evaluated at the initial consultation.  In many instances, a health insurer will have a right of subrogation against the proceeds of recovery in a personal injury case, which means they must be paid back what they advanced for medical care caused by the negligence of another.  In some instances, that subrogation interest may become an actual lien against the proceeds of recovery but can frequently be reduced through negotiations by up to one-third or more.  Our attorneys and staff frequently are successful at negotiating reductions of health insurance subrogation claims and liens.  We consider this a service to our clients and a critical part of our legal representation.  Should you wish to consult with an attorney about your personal injury case, please contact our office.
Belsky, Weinberg & Horowitz is proud to announce that Alan J. Belsky, Robert L. Weinberg, Jeff Horowitz and Antonio Aquia have received the prestigious "Super Lawyer" designation by the publication, Law & Politics.  Identification as a Super Lawyer involves a rigorous four-step process:  (1) Creation of the Candidate Pool Through a Statewide Survey of Lawyers; Evaluation of Candidates by the Law & Politics Research Department; Peer Evaluation by Practice Area; and a Final Selection Process according to firm demographics in the state.  Only five percent of all lawyers in the state receive the Super Lawyer designation.  This year, Mr. Belsky received the degination for Plaintiffs' Personal Injury--Medical Malpractice. Mr. Weinberg received the designation for Plaintiffs' Personal Injury--General; Mr. Horowitz received the designation for Plaintiff's' Workers' Compensation; and Mr. Aquia received the designation in Bankruptcy & Creditor/Debtor Rights. 

There is a famous quote oft-repeated by judges that a client who serves as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.  "Pro se litigants" as they are referred to by the bar rarely succeed in getting a fair day in court.  In an opinion rendered today by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, a well prepared and apparently legally shrewd pro se litigant won his battle against Gateway Computer Company of South Dakota over procedural squabbles arising from the small print contained in the agreements he was required to sign when he purchased his EMachine from Best Buy.
 
As the Court noted in its opinion, the dispute giving rise to the appeal had a "humble origin." A Best Buy customer purchased a computer that didn't work properly.  In a scenario many are familiar with, after many hours on the phone with Gateway technical support and after presenting to Best Buy and being told they would not fix the machine without charging him several hundred dollars, he sued Gateway and Best Buy for his money back ($377.98), plus $30,000 in consequential damages.  Sounds simple enough, right?  Well, here's where the fun began for the pro se plaintiff.  
 
The plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County-a Maryland state court, alleging breach of express and implied  warranties and violation of certain state consumer protection and federal warranty laws.  Inside the Emachine packing box, however, was  a document entitled "One Year Limited Warranty" that provided, among other things, that all disputes were to be arbitrated, not litigated, and that South Dakota law would govern the resolution of all disputes.  As a result, the circuit court dismissed the case even though the plaintiff had asked for more time to conduct prehearing discovery.  
 
Well, the plaintiff did not give up after dismissal.  He appealed his case to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals asserting eleven grounds upon which the circuit court erred.  Today, the court issued its published opinion.  After a significant investment of time and money way beyond the amount in dispute, the plaintiff won and he won big indeed because of the jurisprudence enuniciated by the Court in its decision!
 
The Court of Special Appeals, in a very interesting published opinion styled Henry v. Gateway, Inc., concluded that the plaintiff's right to pre-hearing discovery was not enforced by the trial court and that he was entitled to learn of certain information from Gateway before the motions hearing that resulted in dismissal.  The Court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the case.
 
As a second and more legally interesting basis for reversal, the Court analyzed its role in reconciling out of state federal law against clear and contrary law from our state supreme court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  The federal issue before the court was whether federal warranty laws (Magnuson Moss Act) prevailed over federal arbitration laws so that a litigant claiming violation of federal warranty law could not be forced to arbitrate their claims under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The Court concluded on several grounds that Maryland state law controlled despite the choice of law provision that South Dakota law controlled.

The Court concluded that despite a majority of federal courts that have ruled that federal arbitration laws prevail over federal warranty law so that the warranty claims must be arbitrated, Gateway cited not a single South Dakota case for that proposition and argued only that the South Dakota Supreme Court would side with the majority of federal trial court and appeals decisions from other circuits and would uphold the arbitration clause.  
 
The Maryland appeals court disagreed, and refused to accept a "headcount" of federal cases by the defendant as conclusive proof of how the South Dakota court would rule.  Maryland case law contains a different rule.  "In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 320 (1979), the Court of Appeals citing Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, said that 'unlike decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals construing the federal constitution and acts of the Congress pursuant thereto, are not binding upon us.' See also Dregen v. State, 352 Md. 400, 414, n.8 (1999); Lone v. Montgomery County, 85 Md. App. 477, 494 (1991)."
 
The court continued as follows:
 
Embracing the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second), Maryland appellate courts have long recognized the ability of parties to specify in their contracts which state's law will apply. Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611, 617 (2007). The Court of Appeals has required the existence of a "strong" public policy to override a choice-of-law clause in a contract, id. at 621, and has not hesitated to apply out-of-state law, even where it would trump an act of the General Assembly. Id. at 627.  However, it is difficult to think of a stronger or more fundamental public policy than one expressed in the State Constitution. Nor can we conceive of a more forceful statement of the duty of a state court than found in Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights. Unlike the oath for State office contained in Article I, §9 of the Maryland Constitution, which requires a judge to "support" the laws of the State, Article 2 expressly mandates that "judges of this State" are "bound" by federal law, notwithstanding "anything in the Constitution of Laws of this State to the contrary."20  Moreover, in the absence of a controlling decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Maryland courts are to "decide federal questions the way they believe theSupreme Court would decide them," Donald Ziegler, Gazing at the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 Wm & Mary L. Rev.1143, 1177 (1999), not the way some federal courts have. Pope, supra, 284 Md. at 320.  That is particularly true of a federal question like that presented in Koons Ford, which had divided courts around the country. To adopt appellees' position that a decision of Maryland's highest court on a federal question dissolves because of another state's opposing interpretation of federal law, or because of a headcount of federal appellate or district court decisions on the subject, would require Maryland courts to decide a federal question contrary to the way they believe the Supreme Court would have decided it. This would fly in the face of Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights. Thus, we conclude that embracing a decision of another state or a federal court disagreeing with Koons Ford, would, in the words of §187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second), "be contrary to a fundamental policy of [this] State.
Indeed, although the case is somewhat complicated procedurally, it is amazing that the plaintiff, a non-lawyer, mustered the law and arguments together to prevail before the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.  More importantly, though, is the fact that the arbitration provisions in many credit card and loan agreements are controlled by out-of-state law.  To the extent a warranty or choice of law provision is implicated in a dispute involving malfunctioning goods that come with warranties or have end user agreements with arbitration provisions, consumers should take a lesson from the plaintiff in Henry v. Gateway and do their homework before caving in to the legal arguments of big corporations and their attorneys.

Barrington D. Henry v. Gateway, Inc., No. 0537, Sept. Term 2008.

For more information about this case or claims for breach of warranty or product defects, please contact the lawyers at Belsky,Weinberg & Horowitz.

On June, 12, 2009, Maryland's top court rendered a decision in Pittway Corporation, et al. and The Ryland Group v. Stephon Collins, et al., No. 128, September Term, 2007. See Maryland Judiciary Website at http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2009/128a07.pdf. The case is important for its discussion of the difference between what are known as "intervening" and "superceding" acts of negligence in cases involving multiple defendants where each acted negligently at different times but where there is only one injury. Determining the extent to which a defendant's acts are so far removed in time and place from subsequent acts of negligence by other defendants so as to relieve an earlier defendant of liability is a difficult task for any court or jury to determine. The instant case was no different in the degree of complexity of the legal analysis, yet it provides an excellent review of the different types of "causation" issues that a case like this presents and makes clear that trial court judges must usually consider the unique facts of the case before reaching decisions on intervening and superceding acts of negligence which may relieve early defendants of liability.

The case involves tragic facts. A home had been renovated by the owners who converted their basement into a medical office. No permits were pulled for the renovations and electrical work was performed. The home was originally built by Ryland Homes and was renovated by a number of subcontractors. The home was eventually rented out and the basement used for bedrooms. At the time of the original construction and subsequently during the basement renovations, substandard fire detectors were located in the basement with insufficient battery back up. A fire broke out in the home and the children of the renters and their friends were killed or seriously injured when a fire broke out. The plaintiffs alleged that a smoke detector with adequate battery back up would have saved the childrens' lives.

Suit was filed against a large number of defendants, including the manufacturers of the smoke detector and Ryan Homes, alleging negligence and product defects which resulted in the smoke alarm not working when it should have. The smoke alarm at the time was the one originally installed by Ryland during new home construction and was not changed by the renovating contractors and subcontractors during the basement renovations. The manufacturers argued successfully at trial that the failure of the contractors to install newer battery back up alarms were superceding acts of negligence as a matter of law relieving the manufacturers of liability, particularly since the alarms were in compliance with the building code in place at the time the home was built. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case as to the manufacturers and others, and relied upon the allegations contained within the complaint without considering other factual evidence. Thus, the court granted multiple motions to dismiss on the basis that the moving defendants were relieved of responsibility "as a matter of law" due to the superceding acts of the contractors in not removing and reinstalling more modern smoke detectors.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge's decision, and determined that a trial court ordinarily may not rule on "causation" issues as a matter of law simply by considering the facts alleged in the lawsuit itself, and must consider other specific factual evidence developed during the discovery phase of the case. In the last footnote of the opinion, however, the court noted that upon remand to the trial court for further consideration of the specific facts surrounding the installation of the detector, the content of certain user manuals, and other factual evidence, the trial could find superceding acts of negligence by the renovating contractors that would justify dismissal of one or more of the moving defendants from the case.

The complexities of the court's opinion have been omitted and simplified here. Proximate cause is an essential element of every negligence action. Where more than one defendant is involved, the issue of whose acts and omissions "caused" injury are frequently disputed. The lawyers at Belsky, Weinberg & Horowitz keep abreast of the law and legal decisions from our state's courts. We understand the difficulties presented by issues of proximate cause and have dealt successfully with issues similar to those raised in the Pittway case. Please contact our litigation department should you have further questions about our practice areas or a potential claim you have.

In some unfortunate motor vehicle accidents, the at-fault driver leaves the scene. Sometimes the departure is inadvertent or with the intention of returning after retrieving a license or driving around the block to avoid creating more hazardous conditions on the roadway.

When a defendant leaves the scene of an accident, particularly when there's obvious evidence of personal injury, the law in Maryland allows that fact to be presented to the jury and an instruction given to the effect that leaving the scene is evidence of guilt. We have used this rule of evidence successfully in several trials. In our last case where the issue arose, Howard v. Schulman, (Case No. 02C07120453 (A.A. Co Cir. Ct. 2008), a $1.9 million verdict was rendered by an Anne Arundel County jury against the driver of a cement mixer struck and killed one pedestrian and severely injured another after driving onto the shoulder where they were standing next to their disabled vehicle. Not only did the driver not stop, but he abruptly made a u-turn on a major highway utilizing the emergency crossover used for official law enforcement and municipal vehicles and drove by the scene in the opposite direction with the catastrophe he caused in plain view for him to see. He denied any knowledge of the accident. The jury deliberated for an hour before reaching its verdict.

On May 14, 2009, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rendered a decision in the criminal case of Decker v. State, No. 44, Sept. Term 2008, which affirmed the rule that admission of flight is appropriate evidence of guilt. That opinion can be read at the Maryland Judiciary Home Page at http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2009/44a08.pdf. There, the defendant left the courtroom before sentencing and, after an extensive search of the courthouse was unsuccessful at locating the defendant, the case was postponed. the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence of defendant's leaving the courtroom was relevant as consciousness of guilt, because the jury could have reasonably inferred from defendant's actions that he was fleeing the courtroom out of a concern that the trial would not turn out well for him.

What may seem a logical and reasonable rule of evidence is not always applied universally by trial judges, and is dependent on the circumstances of the flight and the events that precede and follow it.

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